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Reason and emotion, not reason or emotion in moral judgment 
Leland F. Saunders* 
Department of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, USA 
One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is 
whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the 
question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, 
whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there 
is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this 
conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused 
by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, 
but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of 
reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for 
metaethics. 
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One of the central questions in metaethics and moral psychology is how moral judgments 
are produced. In rough characterization, cognitivists maintain that moral judgments are 
the products of reason and express moral beliefs, whereas non-cognitivists maintain that 
moral judgments are the products of the emotions and express certain affective or other 
non-cognitive mental states, such as anger or like/dislike. The debate between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists connects up with other important questions with respect 
to morality, such as whether moral judgments can be true, and whether morality is a 
rational enterprise subject to the same norms of rationality as other forms of rational 
judgment and discourse. For the most part, cognitivists maintain that moral judgments 
can be true and that morality is a rational domain subject to norms of rationality, while 
many non-cognitivists maintain that moral judgments cannot be true and that moral 
judgments are not rationally assessable.1 
The debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists involves both a set of 
philosophical issues related to moral epistemology, moral metaphysics and the meaning 
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of moral terms, and the psychological question of how moral judgments are produced. 
These two sets of issues, however, cannot be neatly separated from each other, and many 
philosophers and psychologists argue that making progress on these philosophical 
questions requires first understanding the psychological mechanisms of moral judgment 
(Haidt and Bjorklund 2008; Mikhail 2011; Nichols 2004; Prinz 2006; Stich 1993). 
Because the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists seems to involve 
psychological claims rather centrally, it has recently drawn the attention of empirical 
moral psychologists who view the question of how moral judgments are produced as 
being, at least partly, an empirical question suitable for empirical investigation (see, for 
example, [Cushman and Young 2009; Cushman, Young, and Hauser 2006; Greene et al. 
2009; Hauser 2006; Hauser et al. 2007; Koenigs et al. 2007; Mikhail 2011; Nichols 2004; 
Prinz 2007; Young et al. 2006]). The reasoning here is straightforward. The debate 
between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is in part a dispute about how the mind works, 
and questions of how the mind works are empirical questions that can be investigated by 
empirical methods. Thus, the argument goes, given the structure of the debate between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists, it is one that is amenable to empirical investigation and 
analysis, and perhaps, even more strongly, one that can and should be decided on 
empirical grounds.2  
The psychological investigation into moral judgment has been framed, similarly 
to the philosophical debate, around the question of whether moral judgments are the 
products of reason or emotion; sometimes put rather loosely by empirical moral 
psychologists as a choice between Kant (representing cognitivism), and Hume 
(representing noncognitivism). Call this way of framing the psychological investigation, 
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as a choice between reason and emotion, the standard approach.3 The standard approach 
is widely employed by empirical moral psychologists, but I shall argue that this is 
problematic because there are good reasons for thinking that the standard approach to 
moral judgment relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully 
independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be 
cleanly separated.4 But, as will be argued, there is a significant body of evidence in the 
cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and 
supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of 
psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not 
simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The 
upshot of this argument is that, if correct, it will seriously undercut the explanatory power 
and adequacy of contemporary empirical models of moral judgment, and it will show that 
one important contribution of the cognitive sciences to moral psychology and metaethics 
is to call into question the standard assumptions of how the mind works, and the standard 
categories and axes along which some of these important debates revolve.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to show that the standard 
approach to the psychological question of how moral judgments are produced relies on a 
problematic conception of reason and emotion as fully independent cognitive faculties 
whose causal contributions to any particular cognitive task can be cleanly separated. This 
objection applies to both the current philosophical debate between cognitivists and non-
cognitivists and contemporary empirical accounts of moral judgment, though the focus of 
this paper will primarily be on contemporary empirical accounts of moral judgment. The 
second aim is to lay out a positive account of moral judgment in terms of a complex 
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interplay of both cognitive and affective psychological mechanisms, but not in a way that 
can be meaningfully understood as the interaction of two distinct cognitive faculties, 
reason and emotion.  
 
1. The Standard Approach in Moral Psychology 
The first step in the argument is to spell out some of the context of the standard approach; 
specifically, the view of the mind that informs it, and its typical explanatory role in 
empirical moral psychology. There are many ways to begin, but it may be useful to start 
with an important distinction in the cognitive sciences between two different uses of the 
term “cognitive.”5 In one sense, “cognitive” refers generally to the information 
processing of the mind. It is this sense of “cognitive” that is used in the phrase “cognitive 
science,” and “cognitive faculty.” In a more narrow sense, “cognitive” refers specifically 
to a particular kind of information processing that the mind performs, namely, those that 
relate to reasoning. This narrow sense of “cognitive” is meant to distinguish reasoning 
from other kinds of information processing, and it is primarily used to distinguish 
reasoning processes from those affective processes that relate to emotion. Throughout 
this paper, context should make clear which sense of “cognitive” is being used. When 
context does not make this clear, I shall use the phrase “cognitive in the broad sense” to 
refer to the more general sense of cognitive, and “cognitive in the narrow sense” to refer 
to the more restricted sense of processes related to reasoning.  
This distinction is an important terminological one, but it is also important in that 
it also reveals something of the particular theoretical picture of the mind that underlies 
the cognitive sciences and informs the standard approach; namely, faculty psychology. 
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Faculty psychology, in general, is an approach for understanding how the mind works. As 
Fodor describes it, faculty psychology is the view “that many fundamentally different 
kinds of psychological mechanisms must be postulated in order to explain the facts of the 
mental life” (Fodor 1983, 1 emphasis added). According to the general view of faculty 
psychology, the mind is structured by a set of diverse mental systems that can be thought 
of as the “organs” of the mind that perform different kinds of operations, such as those 
pertaining to memory, perception, judgment, reason and emotion 6 This general view of 
the mind, dating back to at least Descartes, contrasts with the view of the mind as a 
generic and undifferentiated workspace (Chomsky 1980; Fodor 1983). On the faculty 
view, there are differentiated mental mechanisms responsible for performing specific 
kinds of mental tasks analogous to the way that bodily organs are differentiated structures 
that perform very specific kinds of bodily tasks (Chomsky 1980); the heart is the bodily 
structure that pumps blood and the faculty of memory, for example, is the mental 
structure that stores and recalls memories. Moreover, just as bodily organs develop with a 
predictable ontogeny in normal development (e.g., the heart will develop in a predictable 
fashion with a predictable function), cognitive faculties on this view are thought to have a 
predictable ontogeny as well. They are, as it were, part of our ordinary endowment as 
human creatures. 
On the faculty view, cognitive faculties differ from each other in terms of their 
characteristic operations—that is, in terms of the specific kinds of operations that they 
perform—and faculties are individuated in terms of these characteristic operations. The 
faculty of reason, on this view, is the faculty that performs those kinds of operations 
characteristic of reasoning (i.e., cognitive), and emotion is the faculty that performs those 
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kinds of operations characteristic of emotion (i.e., affective).7 They are different faculties 
precisely because, and in virtue of the fact that, they perform different kinds of operations. 
Consequently, on this view, cognitive faculties are independent, separate and operate 
according to their own internal operations. Indeed, having these properties is precisely 
what constitutes being a cognitive faculty at all.  
Faculty psychology is a widely shared theoretical picture of how the mind works 
(Fodor 1983, 12), and importantly, it supplies a theoretical framework for how to provide 
a psychological explanation. Providing a psychological explanation, under this view, 
consists in giving an account of the ordered operations of distinct cognitive faculties, and 
how those distinct faculties jointly contribute to some overall cognitive task, often 
represented as a “boxology”. For example, an explanation for how people solve math 
problems may possibly be given by the ordered operations of memory and reason to 
produce a solution. Similarly, an explanation for moral judgment will involve the ordered 
operations of distinct cognitive faculties, and under the assumptions of the standard 
approach two faculties in particular, reason and emotion.  
The assumptions of the standard approach to moral judgment can be easily seen 
by the structures of the psychological explanations offered by empirical moral 
psychologists (i.e., their boxologies) for moral judgment. Take, for example, Haidt’s 
Social Intuitionist Model, perhaps the most influential of contemporary empirical models 
of moral judgment. According to this model, moral judgments are, in the ordinary case, 
caused by emotional responses to a person or action.8 These emotional responses then 
“lead directly” to a moral judgment, which on this view is “the conscious experience of 
blame or praise, including a belief in the rightness or wrongness of the act” (Haidt and 
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Bjorklund, 2008, 188 emphasis in original). While it is unclear what is precisely meant 
by the claim that moral intuitions “lead directly” to a moral judgment, the most 
straightforward interpretation of the view is that certain emotional reactions are a 
sufficient cause of a person’s moral belief that some action is right or wrong, and this 
moral belief is the moral judgment. Once the moral judgment is produced, on this view, a 
person may use reason to defend that judgment to others through post hoc rationalizations. 
On occasion, reason may change the way a situation is affectively perceived, leading to a 
possible change in moral judgment.  
There are some additional details to the Social Intuitionist Model, but they are not 
important for present purposes. What is important to note is the mode of psychological 
explanation on offer, where emotion has one set of tasks in moral judgment, reason has 
another, and the causal contributions of each can be cleanly and neatly separated. The 
Social Intuitionist Model is hardly alone in providing this sort of psychological 
explanation. Prinz (2007) provides a similar sort of boxology for moral judgment. Prinz 
uses the example of pickpocketing to explain his model of moral judgment, and it is 
useful to follow his outline (2007, 96). On this model, a person first perceives an action 
of pickpocketing and categorizes that action as falling under some concept, which 
sometimes involves reason. In the case of pickpocketing, the person categorizes the 
action as falling under the concept of STEALING. If the person has a rule against 
stealing, then classifying the perceived action as stealing activates that moral rule in long-
term memory to produce a moral judgment. Importantly, according to Prinz, a moral rule 
is a sentiment toward a concept, which disposes a person to produce an emotion, and that 
emotion, bound to a representation of the eliciting action, constitutes the moral judgment. 
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There are some additional details to this model, but the important point is that this model 
attempts to explain moral judgment by the ordered operations of two cognitive faculties, 
reason and emotion, though similarly to the Social Intuitionist Model, reason is given 
very little direct causal influence on moral judgment.  
One last model of moral judgment that exemplifies the standard approach is 
Greene’s well-known dual process model. According to Greene, reason and emotion are 
independent systems for coming to a moral judgment. Reason produces characteristically 
utilitarian moral judgments, and emotion produces characteristically deontological 
judgments (Greene 2008; Greene et al., 2001).9 On this view, moral dilemmas occur (or 
are felt to occur) when these two independent systems produce conflicting moral 
judgments (e.g., reason produces a judgment that a certain action is permissible, while 
emotion produces a judgment that the same action is impermissible). When such conflicts 
occur, an overall judgment is arrived at through a conflict resolution system, though the 
precise details of this mechanism are not spelled out. Importantly, though, this model 
again explains moral judgment by the ordered operations of reason and emotion, only in 
this case the two faculties operate more competitively than cooperatively.  
The point of describing these three influential models of moral judgment is not to 
show that some empirical moral psychologists assume the truth of the standard approach, 
but to show that the standard approach is a pervasive background assumption that frames 
the very way empirical moral psychologists investigate the causal mechanisms of moral 
judgment. In each of these models it is taken to be the case that reason and emotion are 
two distinct cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be 
cleanly and neatly separated, and that the correct psychological explanation of moral 
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judgment will be given in terms of the ordered operations of these two faculties. The only 
points of contention among empirical moral psychologists are what those operations are 
and how they are ordered.   
However, it is the contention of this paper that moral judgment cannot 
meaningfully be explained by the ordered operations of just two cognitive faculties, 
reason and emotion. To be clear, the point at issue here is not whether faculty psychology 
provides the right theoretical picture of the mind—it is assumed here that it does—the 
point at issue is whether the standard approach carves up the mind in the right way, that is, 
whether there is something like a faculty of reason and something like a faculty of 
emotion such that an explanation in terms of the ordered workings of those two faculties 
is at all informative. To put the point in sharper relief, the question is whether the best 
way to think about how moral judgments are produced is in terms of the ordered 
operations of just two cognitive faculties, reason and emotion, whose causal contributions 
to moral judgment can be neatly separated and ordered. The evidence, it will be argued, 
suggests that the answer to this question is very likely not, and that how moral judgments 
are produced cannot be meaningfully understood in this way because there are good 
reasons for thinking that moral judgment involves both cognitive (in the narrow sense) 
and affective psychological mechanisms, but in a way that is not simply a function of the 
independent contributions of two sharply separated and ordered cognitive faculties, 
reason and emotion. 
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2. The Challenge from Cognitive Science 
Implicit in the standard approach to moral judgment is the assumption that reason and 
emotion, as cognitive faculties, are “closed boxes”—that is, that their respective internal 
operations and mechanisms are clearly distinct from, and causally closed off to, each 
other. On this view, the internal operations and mechanisms of reason cannot and do not 
causally interact with the internal operations and mechanisms of emotion, and vice versa. 
This sort of causal closure is implicit in the notion of a cognitive faculty that 
distinguishes faculties in terms of kinds of cognitive operations. And because reason and 
emotion are “closed boxes” on this view, the causal relationships between reason and 
emotion must be limited to a set of relatively simple input-output operations—e.g., 
reason can input to emotion the results of conceptual categorization, or emotion can input 
to reason a quick and automatic “moral intuition”—and moral judgment is to be 
explained by the ordered operations of these two faculties, along with some specification 
of their respective input-output operations. This is precisely what the typical “boxologies” 
of moral judgment given by empirical moral psychologists depict.  
The challenge that cognitive science raises for the standard approach is that there 
is a great deal of evidence that many social and evaluative judgments, including moral 
judgments, are caused by sets of deeply integrated cognitive and affective mechanisms, 
not two “closed” cognitive faculties, reason and emotion. That is, the best explanation of 
many social and evaluative judgments, including moral judgments, is in terms of a 
complex set of causal interactions among many different cognitive and affective 
mechanisms whose joint contributions are both necessary to produce a judgment and 
whose causal contributions cannot be neatly separated. So, instead of a view of the mind 
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that is easily carved among a handful of cognitive faculties and their ordered input-output 
operations, the cognitive sciences suggest a view of the mind that is deeply integrated 
among large sets of cognitive and affective mechanisms, particularly with respect to what 
Maiese (2014) calls our “sense-making capacities” i.e., our capacities for social and 
evaluative judgments.  
What makes a set of mechanisms deeply integrated has to do with how they are 
causally arranged and how they causally interact. The claim that cognitive and affective 
mechanisms are deeply integrated with respect to moral judgment involves at least three 
elements: that the cognitive and affective causal contributions to a moral judgment is a 
function of more fine-grained cognitive mechanisms rather than a function of two 
faculties, reason and emotion; that the causal connections among cognitive and affective 
mechanisms are multi-faceted and sometimes non-linear in such a way that makes their 
various causal contributions to a judgment virtually impossible to separate in practice; 
and that moral judgments are caused by a complicated set of causal interactions among 
cognitive and affective mechanisms. From these three structural elements it also seems to 
follow that particular moral judgments (or particular sets of moral judgments) may 
require different explanations as it is possible that different moral judgments will involve 
a slightly different, if largely overlapping, set of cognitive and affective mechanisms.  
The approach in what follows will be to provide a somewhat independent defense 
for each of the three elements of the claim that moral judgments are caused by sets of 
deeply integrated cognitive and affective mechanisms, though these elements are also 
mutually supporting so there will be some overlap between them. Regardless, it is helpful, 
as much as possible, to take the points individually, starting with the first. In support of 
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this point, there is quite a bit of evidence that many moral judgments depend upon, or are 
causally influenced by, a set of fine-grained cognitive mechanisms that are distinct from 
the sort of general reasoning ability that might be represented by a faculty of reason. One 
such line of evidence comes from research on people’s attributions of intentions and 
causal responsibility to others (Cushman and Young 2011; Mikhail 2009, 2011; Saxe, 
Carey, and Kanwisher 2004; Young and Saxe 2011).10 For example, if Jones rolls a 
bowling bowl that knocks over 12 pins, whereas Smith allows the ball to roll, it is typical 
to think that Jones is more causally responsible than Smith for the pins falling over (this 
example from [Cushman and Young 2011, 3]). Furthermore, it is typical to think that 
Jones more likely intended to knock the pins over, while it is much less clear what Smith 
intended, if anything, in this case. Causal and intentional attributions are pervasive in our 
interactions with others because they are particularly important in making sense of others. 
Indeed, making sense of other people’s behavior is almost always done in terms of what 
we take them to have intended to do and what we take them to have been causally 
responsible for bringing about.11  
Importantly, people’s ability for causal and intentional attribution seems to be 
independent of general reasoning ability, which would indicate that it is not simply an 
aspect of a general-purpose faculty of reason. Studies indicate that young children (as 
young as 12-months old) are already making sophisticated causal and intentional 
attributions (Kuhlmeier 2013; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, and Bloom 2003; Wynn 2007), which is 
well before children generally have otherwise achieved sophisticated general reasoning 
ability. Moreover, there is evidence that indicates that the capacity for causal and 
intentional attributions can be dissociated from general reasoning ability. For example, 
 13 
those who suffer from Down syndrome can have severe general learning difficulties 
without any consequent difficulties in causal and intentional attribution, whereas those on 
the autism spectrum can have great proficiency in general reasoning ability but lack a 
capacity for causal and intentional attributions (reported in [Carruthers 2006, 173]). 
These data very strongly suggest that causal and intentional attributions are the result of 
fine-grained cognitive mechanisms, not something like a general-purpose faculty of 
reason.  
Importantly, causal and intentional attributions are relevant to many social 
judgments, including moral judgments. For example, whether someone judges an action 
to be right or wrong first requires determining that an action (or culpable omission) was 
performed (or omitted), and that the person is causally responsible for the result. 
Furthermore, studies by Cushman and Young (2011) show that some patterns in people’s 
moral judgments (i.e., whether some action or omission is judged to be right or wrong) 
reliably track differences in people’s causal and intentional attributions. There is, thus, 
very strong evidence that causal and intentional attributions play an important causal role 
in most, if not all, moral judgments, and that such attributions are the result of a cognitive 
mechanism or a set of cognitive mechanisms that is distinct from something like a 
general-purpose faculty of reason.   
Another set of cognitive mechanisms that can causally contribute to people’s 
moral judgments are those that relate to heuristics and biases. Research on heuristics and 
biases shows that people’s reasoning, judgment, and decision-making is very often 
influenced by a set of “mental shortcuts” that may, more often than not, result in an 
appropriate judgment or decision, but can also quite reliably result in poor judgments or 
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decisions. Some typical examples include framing effects, anchoring effects, and 
attribution substitution, but what is important is that each of these heuristics seems to 
involve a different cognitive mechanism, and that the functioning of these heuristics is 
independent of general reasoning ability (Kahneman 2003). Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) 
argues that at least some heuristic mechanisms can influence moral judgments, 
sometimes in problematic ways by focusing on Tversky and Kahneman’s famous Asian 
disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
In the Asian disease problem, people are told that an expected outbreak of an 
Asian disease will kill 600 people. They are given two options for how to address this 
outbreak. Option A, they are told, will save 200 people, whereas Option B has a one-third 
chance of saving everyone, and a two-thirds chance of saving no one. When phrased in 
this way, most people select Option A. However, when the options are worded differently, 
even with no change in the actual numerical outcomes of each option, people’s choices 
change dramatically. When people are told that Option A will result in 400 dead; whereas 
with Option B there is a one-third probability that no one will die, and a two-thirds 
probability that 600 people will die, most people select Option B.  
The Asian disease problem is an example of the framing effect where the same 
outcomes framed in positive language are more frequently chosen than the same 
outcomes framed in negative language. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that people’s choices 
in these cases reflect moral judgments, because the choices involve distributing harms 
and goods. This case is hardly unique. Framing effects have been found to influence 
people’s moral judgments in response to a wide variety of moral vignettes (Petrinovich, 
O’Neill, and Jorgensen 1993).12 
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The important point here is that there is fairly robust evidence that framing effects 
rely on fine-grained cognitive mechanisms that are independent of general reasoning 
ability, and that such effects reliably influence moral judgments. Moreover, there is also 
evidence from research with respect to situationism, which indicates that people’s moral 
judgments, not just overt behaviors, can be strongly influenced by situational factors and 
cues, such as finding a dime in a phone booth, or the presence of loud noises, or a 
disgusting environment (Merritt, Doris, and Harman 2010). As Merritt et al. write:  
How people respond to their environment depends on how they ‘code’ it, 
and this coding itself is highly dependent on environmental factors. The 
empirical research suggests that reason is no less situationally susceptible 
than overt behavior; the suggestion we must consider is that notions of 
rationality operative in traditional understandings of character are 
themselves empirically inadequate (360). 
 
As these authors argue, how people go about reasoning through various moral 
questions or about what to do in particular situations, is typically causally influenced by a 
number of fine-grained cognitive and affective mechanisms that are responsible for 
making sense of the environment and situation, and those sense-making capacities are 
prior to, and independent of, general-purpose reasoning.  
Taken together, the evidence strongly supports the claim that, in a wide range of 
circumstances, fine-grained cognitive mechanisms play a significant causal role in moral 
judgment. So far the evidence provides less support for the contribution of fine-grained 
affective mechanisms to moral judgment, though this will be supported by the evidence 
 16 
for the second element in the claim that cognitive and affective mechanism are deeply 
integrated in moral judgment, namely that the causal connections among cognitive and 
affective mechanisms are multi-faceted and sometimes non-linear as opposed to the 
simpler input-output operations of two faculties as given by the standard approach.  
First, there are multiple lines of evidence suggesting that some cognitive 
mechanisms causally contribute to many morally significant affective responses. For 
example, some emotions depend upon attaining a certain level of development. Being 
able to experience guilt requires that a person have some notions of, inter alia, 
responsibility, standards of behavior, and being at fault. Guilt is an emotion that only 
cognitively complex creatures can experience precisely because it depends upon a 
complex suite of cognitive mechanisms (Denham 1998). Moreover, as Maiese (2014, 
814) writes, “The claim that emotion and cognition are deeply integrated, rather than 
operating separately, is supported by the fact that the development of one’s cognitive 
capacities ordinarily occurs together with the development of ever-sophisticated patterns 
of emotional attunement.”  
This is quite consistent with both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s findings that, for 
ordinary people, moral judgment develops as an increasingly nuanced and complex 
capacity in line with increasingly complex modes of thought and expression (Kohlberg, 
Levine, and Hewer 1983; Piaget 1932). It is also consistent with the findings that children 
reliably display increasingly fine-grained distinctions in their moral thinking. For 
example, children typically distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions by 
the time they are 3-5 years old (Turiel 1983). Children 3-4 year-olds use intent to 
distinguish morally between two actions with the same outcome; 4-5 year-olds 
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recommend proportional punishments for individuals based on how wrong the action is; 
and 5-6 year-olds allow the false factual beliefs can be an excusing condition, but not 
false moral beliefs (reported in [Mikhail 2007]).  
The evidence suggests that developing these cognitive abilities is a prerequisite 
for the “sophisticated emotional attunement” in the moral domain to which Maiese refers. 
Moreover, many affective responses require some sort of prior cognition. For example, as 
already discussed, in many cases how a person responds emotionally to an action or event 
will depend upon causal and intentional attributions. Whether one should be angry with 
Smith or Jones will depend upon whom one determines to have committed the offending 
action and for what reason. Similarly, there is evidence that attributing morally relevant 
complex emotional reactions to others relies on a system of cognitive and affective 
mechanisms, commonly called a “theory of mind,” which involves attributing thoughts, 
beliefs, perceptions and emotions to others (Saxe et al. 2004).  
So far this evidence only shows that some morally significant emotions depend 
upon the operations of some cognitive mechanisms, and this is a point that most 
sentimentalist are willing to grant. In order to provide evidence that affective and 
cognitive mechanisms are deeply integrated there must be evidence for more wide-
ranging ways that cognitive and affective mechanisms interact, and there is plenty from 
research on moods, emotion regulation, and fMRI studies on social judgment. The 
argument here will also involve arguing for the third element of the claim that cognitive 
and affective mechanisms are deeply integrated, namely that moral judgment is best 
explained by complex sets of causal interactions among cognitive and affective 
mechanisms.  
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Research on moods helps complicate the picture of the causal relationship 
between affective and cognitive mechanisms. Moods are more general and global 
affective states, and there is evidence that moods influence the way in which people 
reason through certain tasks. For example, happy moods are associated with top-down 
reasoning strategies (relying primarily on pre-existing knowledge structures), whereas 
sad moods are associated with bottom-up reasoning strategies (detail-oriented and 
specific)—an association that is more marked in complex social situations such as those 
where people typically produce moral judgments (Schwarz 2002). Indeed, in one 
experiment on moral judgment participants were more likely to judge it permissible to 
push a fat man in front of a runaway trolley in order to save five people (Valdesolo and 
DeSteno 2006); a judgment that it is associated with top-down, reflective reasoning 
strategies (Greene et al. 2001; Royzman, Landy, and Leeman 2015). Importantly, this is 
different from the observation that emotions or other affective states can make certain 
aspects of a situation more salient to a person as input to reasoning; this research 
indicates that people’s moods and other affective states play a significant role in how they 
go about reasoning. These findings again point to a much more complicated relationship 
between affective and cognitive mechanisms than that given by the standard approach. 
Indeed, it is very hard to explain how affective states can influence the inner workings of 
reason if emotion and reason are taken to be “closed boxes” that causally interact only 
through a few input-output operations, as the standard approach assumes.  
Another line of evidence for the deep causal integration of cognitive and affective 
mechanisms comes from a substantial body of evidence that indicates that cognitive 
mechanisms can, and often do, actively regulate affective responses. In fact, people 
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routinely employ a number of cognitive strategies for intensifying, avoiding, limiting, or 
eliminating various emotional reactions depending upon their social goals (Gross 2002; 
Suri, Sheppes, and Gross 2013). For example, in sad or uncomfortable situations people 
may consciously chose to shift their attention to more positive aspects in order to “get 
through it” (e.g., focusing on positive memories at a funeral in order to express gratitude 
for those in attendance). In other instances, people may cognitively reframe particular 
actions so as to control their own reactions (e.g., “it was really a clever joke, not an insult, 
so I shouldn’t be so mad”), or simply attempt to stifle an emotional reaction that they 
judge to be counterproductive (e.g., holding back one’s anger towards a co-worker whose 
contribution to a project is necessary to success). In other cases, people simply use self-
control, that is, top-down cognitive inhibition and suppression, to regulate their emotional 
responses (Bargh and Williams 2007). It is important to note that emotional regulation is 
such a pervasive feature of adult life that almost all adult emotions are regulated in some 
way to the point where it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the mechanisms of 
emotion generation and those of emotional regulation (Gross and Thompson 2007).13 
Brain scans reveal a similarly complex causal picture of emotion regulation, 
indicating that different cognitive regulatory strategies involve similar brain areas, but 
that those brain regions are activated at different points during the emotion-generative 
process (Ochsner and Gross 2005, 2008). Cognitive reappraisal, for example, activates 
the prefrontal cortex early in emotion-generation, which leads to decreased activity in the 
amygdala/insula region; whereas emotion suppression is correlated with late activation of 
the prefrontal cortex and increasing activity in the amygdala/insula region (Ochsner and 
Gross 2008). This again indicates that cognitive and affective mechanisms are engaged in 
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sets of more complicated causal relationships that can be activated at various points in the 
emotion-generative process or emotion regulation process.  
Research on emotion regulation suggests a further way in which cognitive 
mechanisms can be causally interact with some affective mechanisms, namely that 
consciously controlled emotional regulations can be made effectively automatic in such a 
way that people automatically regulate their emotions in a manner consistent with their 
conscious choice, but in a way that no longer relies on conscious mechanisms (Bargh and 
Williams 2007; Gallo et al. 2009).14 For example, Gallo et al.’s (2009) study suggests that 
consciously adopting “if-then” plans (e.g., “And if I see a spider, then I will remain calm 
and relaxed!” (18)), can effectively down-regulate fearful reactions to spiders 
automatically over time. Again, this indicates that there are a number of complex causal 
interactions among various conscious and nonconscious cognitive mechanisms and 
affective mechanisms in the emotion-generative process.  
One final point needs to be made with respect to emotion regulation, and that is 
that there is evidence for the cognitive regulation of emotions in moral judgment as well. 
For example, disgust has been shown to influence moral judgments (Eskine, Kacinik, and 
Prinz 2011; Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993; Schnall et al. 2008; Wheatley and Haidt 2005), 
and this evidence is often used to support sentimentalist accounts of moral judgment, 
such as Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model or Prinz’s model of moral judgment. However, 
there is also evidence that disgust can be modulated and regulated using a number of 
cognitive strategies, including forming an “if-then” plan, among others (for a review, see 
[Helion and Pizarro 2015]). Moreover, it would seem that many, if not all, morally 
relevant emotional reactions can be cognitively regulated using a number of different 
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strategies, which again indicates that cognitive and affective mechanisms causally 
interact in a number of complex ways in moral judgment. 
The last line of evidence that supports the claim that cognitive and affective 
mechanisms are deeply integrated with respect to social and evaluative judgments comes 
from neuroimaging studies. Wager et al. (2008) found that the cognitive reappraisal of 
emotions can rely on multiple and distinct neural pathways, including bidirectional 
pathways between cognitive and affective areas. Similarly, other research has shown that 
many areas of the brain are involved in both cognitive and affective tasks, sometimes 
simultaneously, in such a way that it is not possible to tease out the various contributions 
of cognitive and affective mechanisms in a particular task (for a detailed review, see 
[Pessoa 2008]). These findings led Pessoa to conclude that:  
[T]here are no truly separate systems for emotion and cognition because 
complex cognitive-emotional behaviour emerges from the rich, dynamic 
interactions between brain networks. Indeed, I propose that emotion and 
cognition not only strongly interact in the brain, but that they are often 
integrated so that they jointly contribute to behaviour (148).  
 
That is, the fMRI evidence points to such a deep integration of various brain areas 
in social and evaluative tasks, that it becomes problematic to think of certain brain 
regions as only performing a certain type of task, i.e., cognitive or affective. The fMRI 
scans suggest that the brain is far more integrated than that. And while it is problematic to 
attempt to “read off” our psychology from neuroimaging scans, the psychological data 
also support the view that, in the case of social and evaluative judgments, affective and 
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cognitive mechanisms are deeply integrated. Moreover, more recent fMRI research on 
moral judgment indicates a far more complicated set of relationships between cognitive 
and affective brain areas in moral judgment as well. For example, an fMRI study with 
particular focus on judgments with respect to justice found that such judgments activated 
areas of the brain associated with empathy, goal representation, and decision-making—a 
mix of affective and cognitive areas (Yoder and Decety 2014). 
Taken together, the research on moods, emotion regulation, and fMRI studies 
indicates that the causal interactions among various cognitive and affective mechanisms 
are very complex in social and evaluative judgments, including moral judgments. This 
again supports the claim that cognitive and affective mechanisms are deeply integrated 
with respect to moral judgment, and that moral judgment is better explained in this way 
than by simple input-output operations between just two cognitive faculties, reason (i.e., 
conscious deliberation) and emotion.  
As deep as the integration can be between the cognitive and affective 
contributions to a judgment, it is important to be clear that this does not mean that the 
distinction between cognitive and affective mechanisms breaks down completely. There 
is still something to be said for the intuitive distinction between reason and emotion, and 
not all cognitive and affective mechanisms are integrated in these deep ways. As Gray et 
al. (2002, 4115) put it:  
Integration does not mean that emotion is an intrinsic aspect of cognition 
or vice versa, or that emotion and cognition are completely identical (in 
fact, they can be integrated only if they are separable). Multiple processing 
streams exist, not all of which need to be integrated. 
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This is quite right—the data do not support the claim that all affective and 
cognitive mechanisms are deeply integrated, and perhaps there are some cognitive (in the 
broad sense) tasks that rely solely on cognitive mechanisms and others that rely solely on 
affective mechanisms. The argument here is not that there is no distinction between 
cognitive and affective mechanisms, or even between some paradigmatically cognitive 
tasks and paradigmatically affective tasks. That would entail that faculty psychology is 
simply incorrect, which is not the aim of this paper. Rather, the argument is that for many 
complex social and evaluative judgments, including moral judgments, the evidence from 
the cognitive sciences very much suggests that they are produced by sets of deeply 
integrated cognitive and affective mechanisms that are jointly necessary for such 
judgments.  
The claim that cognitive and affective mechanisms are deeply integrated 
distinguishes this from the standard approach, which assumes that the functional units of 
cognitive organization and explanation with respect to moral judgment are two cognitive 
faculties of reason and emotion, which causally interact in somewhat limited ways. On 
the view being defended here, the functional units of explanation for moral judgment are 
more fine-grained than that, and it claims that the best explanation of moral judgment is 
in terms of complex sets of multi-faceted causal interactions among them.  
 
3. Conclusion 
History shows that in many nascent empirical fields it is tempting to interpret 
experimental results in light of a prevailing intuitive picture of the world. Moral 
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psychologists have largely interpreted the results of empirical investigation into moral 
judgment in light of the intuitive view that reason and emotion are distinct cognitive 
faculties, and that moral judgment is to be explained in terms of the ordered input-output 
operations of those faculties. This is the same intuitive view that informs many 
philosophical debates in metaethics as well. However, against the backdrop of other 
findings in the cognitive sciences, the empirical data with respect to social and evaluative 
judgments, including moral judgments, suggests a different and far more complicated 
picture of our moral psychology, and opens up new conceptual space for an explanation 
of moral judgment. Namely, it supports the view that moral judgment is the result of sets 
of deeply integrated cognitive and affective mechanisms, whose joint causal 
contributions cannot be reduced to the ordered input-output operations of reason and 
emotion.  
If the argument here is correct, it has some important implications for research in 
metaethics. The particular focus of the argument of this paper has been on empirical 
models of moral judgment, but the standard approach is widely assumed in the 
metaethical literature as well, where explaining moral judgment is often thought to be a 
choice between cognitivists and non-cognitivists views. One of the real challenges in 
debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is that moral judgments seem to have 
properties of both cognitive and non-cognitive mental states (Smith 1994; Williams 
1973). That is, they are belief-like in some ways (e.g., there are apparent demands on 
consistency), and affect-like in some others (e.g., they are reliably connected to 
motivation). Non-cognitivists face challenges in attempting to capture the apparent 
belief-like properties of moral judgments, and the Frege-Geach problem is a notorious 
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one for such views (Geach 1960). On the other hand, cognitivists face challenges in 
attempting to capture the motivational upshot of moral judgments. The result of these 
difficulties is that the cognitivist/non-cognitivists debate in metaethics appears to be 
intractable.  
It is possible, and even likely, that the source of this intractability is that the 
debate assumes a problematic view of the mind. Many metaethicists are committed to a 
view of the mind where moral judgment is to be explained by the ordered operations of 
reason and emotion. This view of the mind makes it quite difficult to see how moral 
judgments could be anything other than typical instances of either beliefs or emotions. If, 
however, moral judgment is best explained by sets of deeply integrated cognitive and 
affective mechanisms, it becomes less mysterious how moral judgments could have 
belief-like and emotion-like properties, because moral judgment itself involves both 
cognitive and affective mechanisms. Indeed, this is consistent with the views of many 
neo-sentimentalists who view moral judgments as rational affective states (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2000; McDowell 1988a, 1988b; Wiggins 1987). 
Metaethical questions involve a number of related but distinct issues, including 
those in moral epistemology, metaphysics, and the meaning of moral terms. However, the 
arguments in these fields must also assume or at least turn on some picture of the mind 
and how the mind is put together. To the extent to which these debates depend upon a 
problematic conception of the mind they will produce problematic answers to their 
central and animating questions. Empirical moral psychology cannot settle these 
metaethical debates, but it can and should inform them, and as research in the cognitive 
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sciences reveals a different picture of the mind a reevaluation of positions and conceptual 
space in metaethics will be required.  
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1 This is a very broad characterization with many exceptions. Mackie (1977), for example, is a cognitivist 
who maintains that all moral judgments are false. And while early non-cognitivists, such as A.J. Ayer 
(1952) took it as an upshot of their views that they implied that moral judgments could not be true or 
rationally assessable, many contemporary non-cognitivists do not take a similar position, and attempt to 
show how non-cognitive moral judgments can be true and rationally assessable, in some sense (see, for 
example, [Gibbard, 1990]).  
2 Nichols, for example, argues that “Many of the deepest issues concerning the nature of morality would be 
illuminated if we had an adequate account of the nature of moral judgment” (2002, 221), while Mikhail 
makes the much stronger claim “that the future of moral philosophy rests squarely within the cognitive and 
brain sciences” (2011, 11).  
3 Greene (2008; 2001) is one notable exception. His dual-process model of moral judgment will be 
discussed later, but is still subject to the general criticism raised in this paper.   
4 This is the view of reason and emotion can be easily seen in the so-called “boxologies” that are prevalent 
among empirical moral psychologists, where boxes are used to represent the flow of information and 
information processing between reason and emotion that leads to a moral judgment. Examples of these 
boxologies will be discussed in the next section.  
5 Greene (2008, 40-41) offers a similar distinction, though he distinguishes cognitive from emotion in terms 
of their differential effects on behavior. 
6 This general description of cognitive faculties is consistent with many different ways of fleshing out some 
of the details. For example, it is indifferent to whether the best way to characterize the difference among 
faculties is solely in terms of their characteristic function, or also in terms of different kinds of 
propositional knowledge as Chomsky and Descartes maintain. 
7 Obviously any plausible account of a cognitive faculty will have to say something about what constitutes 
the kinds of operations characteristic of reasoning, and the kinds of operations characteristic of emotion. 
These claims are often theoretically loaded (see, for example, [Greene, 2008]). 
8 They call these quick emotional reactions moral intuitions, which they define as “the sudden appearance 




the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (2008, 188). 
9 According to Greene, reason produces consequentialist moral judgments, which “are judgments in favor 
of characteristically consequentialist conclusions,” and emotion produces deontological judgments, which 
“are judgments in favor of characteristically deontological conclusions” (2008, 39). Importantly for 
Greene’s picture of moral judgment, reason and emotion produce different kinds of moral judgments 
because they operate in distinct ways and thus produce distinct outputs. Reason, according to Greene, 
operates on representations that are “inherently neutral” (40), such as beliefs or propositions, while emotion 
is “subserved by processes that in addition to being valenced, are quick and automatic, though not 
necessarily conscious” (41). To put the point differently, reason operates in a cool, reflective, and 
controlled manner on propositions to produce non-valenced moral judgments, while emotion operates 
quickly, automatically, and non-consciously to produce emotionally valenced moral judgments. 
10 Mikhail argues that these various causal and intentional attributions are themselves elements of a 
complex moral grammar. Cushman and Young provide very compelling evidence that causal and 
intentional attributions are prior to moral evaluations, not part of them.  
11 There is also evidence from research on the so-called “Knobe effect,” of the side-effect-effect which 
indicates that people’s causal and intentional attributions can be influenced by their moral judgments 
(Knobe, 2004, 2006). This may initially seem to undermine the argument being made here, that moral 
judgments depend upon such attributions, but it actually supports the overall thesis that moral judgment 
will be best explained by sets of complex causal interactions among various cognitive and affective 
mechanisms, and that some of those causal interactions will be bidirectional. The side-effect-effect should 
be seen as evidence for the bidirectionality of causal and intentional attributions; what one is thought to 
have intended is sometimes a function of what it is one is thought to have brought about, especially when 
those outcomes are thought to be bad and the person is thought to have acted with disregard for them.  
12 This study involved providing participants five cases, where the wording was altered between 
participants.  
13 This has led some researchers to conclude that there is no distinction at all between emotion generation 
and emotion regulation (see [Gross and Thomson, 2007] for a discussion).  
14 Similar points are made by Railton (2014) and Sauer (2012). My thanks to an anonymous reviewer who 
pointed out this connection.   
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